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ABSTRACT 
This  paper  presents  and  discusses  some  stylised  facts  of  the  corporate  sector  financial 
structure in Turkey using the Company Sector Accounts compiled by the Central Bank of the 
Republic of Turkey (CBRT). The findings of the paper suggest that non-financial firms in 
Turkey have been heavily exposed almost all of the basic balance sheet risks. The corporate 
sector appears to be excessively leveraged with relatively lower asset tangibility creating also 
a credit risk for the lenders. The firms rely heavily on foreign currency denominated and 
short-term debt instruments making them vulnerable to both exchange rate and interest rate 
shocks through currency and maturity mismatches. The corporate sector can be characterised 
as financially constrained as the deepening of the Turkish bank-based financial system is 
rather low and the bank credits to the private sector tend to be crowded out by the mode of 
domestic  debt  finance.  The  corporate  sector  vulnerabilities  to  maturity,  interest rate  and 
currency  risks  are  found  to  be  improving  with  the  firm  size.  With  the  relatively  stable 
macroeconomic environment and stricter prudential regulation on the financial system, 
the corporate sector balance sheet risks, albeit still are at high levels, tend to be improving 
after the financial crisis of 2001.  
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I. Introduction 
The  structures  of  the  balance  sheets  of  the  main  sectors  (public,  commercial 
banking,  non-financial  corporate  and  households)  of  an  economy  are  crucially 
important for financial stability, sustainable growth and the channels through which 
monetary policy is transmitted. The recent balance sheet approach to financial crisis 
literature such as Krugman (1999), Allen et al. (2002) and Aghion et al. (2004) stress 
the roles of balance sheet vulnerabilities resulting from the level, currency composition 
and maturity of debt of the main economic sectors in triggering and determining the 
output  cost  of  a  crisis.  In  the  same  vein,  credit  channels  of  the  monetary  policy 
transmission mechanisms focus on the balance sheets of lenders (bank lending channel) 
and borrowers (balance sheet channel). Given the fact that the balance sheets of all the 
main sectors of an economy are interrelated and a risk accumulated in one sector can 
have  serious  repercussions  on  the  others,  the  insights  offered  by  the  alternative 
approaches may be interpreted as complementary rather than mutually exclusive.  
In this paper we consider the balance sheets of the non-financial firms
2 in Turkey. 
The  conventional  wisdom  assuming  perfect frictionless markets suggests that firms’ 
real decisions are invariant to both their balance sheet structures and nominal changes 
in the economy (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). The credit channel literature, however, 
considers  capital  market  imperfections  (due  to  asymmetric  information  in  form  of 
moral hazard and adverse selection, agency costs etc.) and provides two complementary 
channels  where  the  financial  positions  of  non-financial  firms  matter  for  their  real 
economic activity (Bernanke et al., 1999 and Gertler et al., 2003). First channel which 
is known as the bank lending, focuses on the asset side of the bank's balance sheets and 
discusses  the  impact  of  changes  in  credit  conditions  on  the  investment/spending 
decisions of borrowers (firms). The second channel that is usually named as the balance 
sheet channel, focuses more on the balance sheets of borrowers rather than those of 
lenders in case of change in monetary policy stance which matters for finance costs and 
thus real activity of borrowers. In essence, the two channels may be expected to be 
interrelated,  amplifying  the  effect  of  a  shock  on  the  economy  as  suggested  by  the 
                                                 
2 We use non-financial firms and corporate sector (firms) interchangeably   2
financial  accelerator  mechanism  (Gertler  et  al.,  2003).  The  magnitude  of  the 
amplification, in turn, depends on the sensitivities of firms’ balance sheets to monetary, 
financial and real shocks.  
The degree of the sensitivities of corporate sector to shocks is associated with 
their capital structure, and the level, currency composition and maturity of their debt. 
Indebtedness and poor collateral position make firms more vulnerable to interest rate 
shocks and deepen the output cost of a financial crisis. Short-term debt, on the other 
hand, can amplify the interest rate risk by creating a rollover risk. Financial positions of 
firms are closely associated with the currency composition of their balance sheets and 
sensitivity of their net worth to real exchange rate fluctuations. Liability dollarisation 
can make firms earning mainly in domestic currency vulnerable to currency mismatch 
risk and real exchange rate depreciations. The financial structures of firms in a country 
may not be invariant to the prevailing institutional structure and the level of financial 
intermediation.  The  corporate  sectors  of  countries  with  relatively  weak  financial 
intermediation can be expected to rely more on internal funds and bank lending than 
those  of  the  countries  with  developed  securities  markets  allowing  firms  also  bond 
financing (Davis and Stone, 2004 and IMF, 2005). The firms in relatively less efficient 
financial systems can be expected to use more trade credits due to an informational 
asymmetry. The finance constraint, the magnitude of which can be more severe with a 
lower  level  of  financial  intermediation,  may  be  varying  across  firm  groupings  with 
different size (Beck et al., 2005a). Beside the level of financial deepening, the public 
sector domestic debt finance via the domestic banking system can lead a decrease in the 
banking  system  preference  to  finance  corporate  sector  (financial  crowding-out)  and 
thus can make the non-financial firms to be severely bank-credit constraint. 
In  this  paper  we  first  present  some  stylised  facts  of  the  non-financial  firms’ 
liability  structure  in  Turkey  using  the  Company  Sector  Accounts  compiled  by  the 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT)
3. To this end, we focus on the basic 
                                                 
3 We restrict our sample to non-financial firms as the behaviour and capital structure of banks under 
financial regulation are not comparable with those of non-financial firms. The CBRT Company Sector 
database covers a wide range of information for around 8000 firms annually after 1990.  The CBRT 
website “www.tcmb.gov.tr” provides detailed information on the database and sectoral data for the years 
after 1997.   3
sources  of  vulnerabilities  including  the  level,  maturity  structure  and  currency 
composition of the debt. The capital structure literature often focuses on the liability 
side of corporate sector balance sheets and ignores the possibility that firms also can 
hedge  themselves.  Furthermore,  non-financial  firms  can  even  behave  as  financial 
intermediaries under a low level of financial development, macroeconomic instability 
and  the  consequent  uncertainty.  Examples  for  the  financial  intermediation  of  non-
financial  firms  may  include  their  heavy  reliance  on  trade  credits  and  holdings  of 
financial  assets  including  government  debt  instruments  and  foreign  exchange 
denominated  assets  to  hedge  against  interest  rate  and  exchange  rate  shocks, 
respectively. Therefore, we consider also the firms’ assets and income statements and 
discuss  the  stylised  facts  of  their  hedging  behaviour  using  the  relevant  available 
information from the corporate sector accounts.  
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In section II, we provide some key 
corporate  finance  indicators  in  Turkey  and  compare  them  with  those  of  groups  of 
industrial  and  developing  countries.  Section II.1 presents some evidence concerning 
firms’  indebtedness  and  collateral  base  to  assess  their  financial  positions  and 
constraints. In II.2 we consider the composition of corporate sector liabilities and assess 
the  roles  of  trade  credits  and  bank  lending  in  the  context  of  the  level  of  financial 
intermediation and the classification of financial systems as “bank” or “market” based. 
Section II.3 focuses on bank loans and stresses on the low levels of financial deepening 
and the banking system preference to finance corporate sector in leading the firms to be 
severely bank-credit constraint in Turkey. The maturity, interest rate and currency risks 
of the corporate sector are discussed in Section II.4. In II.4.1 we consider the maturity 
structure of the debts and interest coverage ratios of the corporate sector firms. The 
currency  composition  of  the  debt and the  corporate  sector  liability  dollarisation  are 
discussed in Section II.4.2. Section II.5 presents the evolution of the basic balance sheet 
fragilities  (debt  level,  maturity  structure,  liability  dollarisation  and  interest  coverage 
risk) before, during and after the 2001 financial crisis. Section III is devoted to the 
discussion of the financial asset holding behaviour of the non-financial firms using the 
relevant available information from their assets and income statements. Government 
domestic debt finance can alleviate or relax the firms’ financial constraints by draining   4
the available resources in the economy or by providing liquidity services, respectively. 
In section III.1, we argue that these affects may not be invariant to both the degree of 
financial deepening and the level and mode of government debt finance. In Section 
III.2, we discuss the financial asset holdings of the firms not only in the context of the 
conventional  transactions/precautionary  motives  for  liquidity  but  also  considering 
potential precautionary-cum-speculative motive under uncertainty which can lead the 
allocation of assets into financial and real investments to be substitutes. Finally, Section 
IV concludes.   
 
II. Corporate Sector Financial Vulnerabilities in Turkey 
Excessive debt and weak liability structure are often defined among the major 
sources of corporate sector vulnerabilities. Table 1 reports some key corporate balance 
sheet  indicators  for  groups  of  developed,  emerging  market  and  small  industrial 
countries along with Turkey. The Turkish corporate sector appears to have the highest 
leverage ratio (measured as debt over total assets) among all the country groups before 
2004 as suggested by the lowest share of shareholders equity in total liabilities. The 
leverage ratio (LR) appears to improve considerably and decreases to a level close to 
those for small industrial countries in 2004. According to the figures, the Turkish firms 
rely least on bond or bank finance and most on trade credits among all the country 
groups suggesting a relatively low level of financial intermediation. The Turkish firms, 
on the other hand, have the lowest asset tangibility and the highest debt ratio potentially 
suggesting a corporate finance puzzle. Profitability of the Turkish firms, which declined 
sharply with the financial crisis of 2001, appears to be somewhat between that of the 
developed and emerging market countries. The liquidity ratio is closer to that of the 
industrial  countries  and  substantially  lower  than  the  group  of  emerging  market 
countries. Given the fact that the bulk of the Turkish corporate sector debt is short-term 
(see  below)  in  contrast  to  the  industrial  countries,  such  a  liquidity  ratio  may  be 
interpreted as relatively low to offset the firms’ greater vulnerability to shocks. During 
most of the period the opportunity cost of remaining liquid by holding Turkish lira (TL) 
cash was extremely high under the sustained high inflation rates. However, as argued in 
Section III.2, the salient features of the Turkish financial system allowed the firms to   5
remain relatively liquid by holding short-term and often foreign currency denominated 
assets also for precautionary and transactions purposes. In the following subsections we 
proceed with the discussion of the main balance sheet vulnerabilities of the Turkish 
non-financial firms in more detail.  
 
Table 1: Some Key Balance Sheet Indicators across Country Groups and Turkey 
 



















1  0.23  0.08  0.63  0.06  0.45
3  3.39
3  0.21 
Germany
1  0.53  0.02  0.42  0.03  0.41  3.88  0.26 
UK




0.30  0.04  0.57  0.08      0.26 
Emerging Markets
1  0.27  0.21
6  0.40  0.14  0.68  7.88  0.42 
Turkey
   (2000)    
All NF Firms
    0.26  000  0.34  0.40 (0.19)  0.25  2.67  0.26
5   
Turkey
 (2000)    
Manuf. Industry 
0.26  0.00  0.36  0.38 (0.20)  0.27  3.80  0.21
5   
Turkey
  (2001)      
All NF Firms 
0.30  0.00  0.29  0.41 (0.19)  0.24  2.20  0.24
5   
Turkey
  (2001)      
Manuf. Industry 
0.25  0.00  0.35  0.40 (0.21)  0.25  2.60  0.19
5 
Turkey
  (2004)      
All NF Firms  0.17  0.00  0.51  0.32 (0.14)  0.28  4.00  0.22




0.18  0.00  0.53  0.30 (0.18)  0.31  4.60  0.19
5   
Notes: 1. 1999 or latest year, source Davis and Stone (2004).   2. The trade credits include also the “other credits”, the values in 
parentheses give the ratio of pure trade credits for the Turkish corporate sector.  3. For the G-3 countries. 4. Source IMF 
(2005a) for all the countries except Turkey.  5. Liquidity Ratio (Cash Ratio) = (Liquid Assets + Marketable Securities)/ 
Short-term Liabilities.  6. Davis and Stone (2004, p. 70) note that, this high share is due to the large share of  bond financing 
in Korea dominating the small sample. Sources: CBRT Company Sector Accounts, Davis and Stone (2004), IMF (2005a) 
and our calculations. 
 
 
II.1.  Leverage Ratios 
Glen and Singh (2003) compute the average leverage ratios (LRs) for developing 
and developed countries in the period of 1994-2000 as 56.4% and 52.6%, respectively. 
Consistent with the findings of Fan, Titman and Twite (2004), Davis and Stone (2004) 
and IMF (2005a), developing country firms appear to have slightly higher LRs. This 
may be a plausible result as financial development can lead firms to move away from 
loan financing (bank and trade credits) towards market financing securities and internal   6
equity. However, such an interpretation ignores the fact that financial structures may 
differ  even  between  countries  with  compatible financial development levels. For an 
international comparison, Figure 1 plots the LRs for the year 2000 provided by Glen 
and Singh (2003). From the figure, it can be inferred that LRs vary substantially across 
countries as well as within country groups. Although the overall picture from Table 1 
may lend a support to the view that “the share of corporate liabilities accounted for by 
loans is decreasing in the level of economic development” (Davis and Stone, 2004, p. 
69), it also calls for a caution as bank based (Germany) and market based (USA and 
UK) systems have substantially different firm debt levels albeit belonging to the same 
developed  country  grouping
4.  These  results,  however,  may  imply  that  firms  in 
developed countries are expected generally to be less financially constrained and less 
likely subject to informational problems and agency costs. These firms prefer mostly 
retained earnings and direct finance that are cheaper than bank finance to satisfy a large 
portion of their financial needs (Myers and Majluf, 1984).   
The Turkish firms are amongst the most indebted as also suggested by Figure 1. A 
similar picture arises when we consider the debt–equity ratio (Table 1). The high level 
of LRs can be a potential source of risk, as higher indebtedness increases the premium 
that  has  to  be  paid  on  external  finance,  and,  thus  can potentially  affect  investment 
adversely. High LRs can also be an indicator of the vulnerability of corporations to 
macroeconomic shocks as recently suggested by the Asian crisis (Ratha et al., 2003 and 
Davis and Stone, 2004).  
                                                 
4  See  Allen,  Chui  and  Maddaloni  (2004),  Byrne  and    Davis  (2004)  and  IMF  (2005)  for  recent 
comparisons of bank-based and market-based financial systems. According to Byrne and Davis (2004) 
there is some evidence of convergence towards a more market-oriented system in the major European 
Union countries during the 1990s. According to IMF (2005, p. 125) “there is no evidence that market-
based systems, or bank-based systems, are associated with better economic performance”.  IMF (2005, 
p.95) further notes that “despite the increasing importance of domestic and international bonds as a 
source of corporate finance, bank lending remains the dominant source of corporate finance for all 
emerging market regions”.  
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Source: Glen and Singh (2003).  
 
Figure  2  reports  the  LRs  of  the  firms
  during  the  1990-2004  period.  The 
manufacturing firms classified as large appear to have smaller leverage ratios compared 
to small and medium size firms during the period.
 5 Large firms tend to finance their 
activity  through  non-debt  finance  i.e.  internal  funds.  For  the  manufacturing  sector, 
medium sized firms are generally more indebted compared to the small firms. Among 
non-financial (NF) firms, manufacturing (Manuf) firms on average appear to be less 
indebted.  Large  manufacturing  firms  have  generally  relied  more  on  internal  finance 
compared to small and medium sized firms especially during expansionary periods as 
these firms are less likely to be financially constrained and they prefer the cheapest 
source of finance - retained earnings - to finance their investment in these times (Figure 
3). However, the share of external finance, mainly debt, increased relatively during the 
recessionary periods of 1999 and 2001 because of either squeezing of their retained 
earnings or shifting to bank finance that is more suitable option for them in these times. 
On the other hand, smaller firms are more likely to be financially constrained and they 
rely more on external finance in general even though they have less access to bank 
                                                 
5  Consistent  with  the  BACH  (The  Bank  of  Harmonised  Data  on  Company  Accounts)  scheme,  we 
classified the firms as small if their sample means of net sales are not larger than EUR 7 millions. The 
firms with sample means of net sales are larger than EUR 40 millions are classified as large whilst the 
rest apparently constituting the medium sized firms.   8
finance compared to larger firms during recessions. In fact, banks are expected to ration 
the  credits  and  thus  they  do  not  want  to  provide  funds  to  small  firms  with  poor 
collateral,  instead  they  prefer  collaterally  rich  large  firms  during  the  economic 
slowdown (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994). Accordingly, the LRs of small firms expected 
to  be  more pro-cyclical  compared  to those of large firms. However, figures for the 
small firms do not confirm this hypothesis in Turkey. The pro-cyclicality of the LRs 
and  thus  investments  arguments  clearly  do  not  consider  the  fact  that  potentially 
constrained firms (especially small firms) had access to trade credits during recessions. 
As  will  be  discussed later in  more details, substantially large share of trade credits 
especially for small and medium sized firms may be interpreted as a buffer providing 
them some chance of avoiding the negative impacts of the finance constraint, and thus 

















































































All NF Firms M_Small M_Medium
M_Large Manuf.  9
 
 
A striking result that can be inferred from Figures 2 and 3 is that the 
leverage ratios for all the sectors tend to decline substantially after the financial 
crisis of 2001. This may be consistent with a view that the Turkish corporate 
firms,  which  were  severely  hit  by  the  crisis  due  to  their  vulnerabilities 
including very high debt levels, became more prudent about external finance 
after the crisis. In addition, relatively stable macroeconomic environment after 
the  crisis  improved  firms’  investment  and  thus  their  internal  funds. 
Consequently, the LRs came down to the levels comparable to those of the 
firms in industrial and small industrial countries by 2004 (Table 1). The decline 
in the LRs and thus the increase in the use of own funds (Own Funds/Total 
Assets  =  1-LR)  after  2001  appears  to  be  more  sharper  for  the  large 
manufacturing firms compared to other firm groups. Consistent with the fact 
that  they  are  the  most  constrained  in  terms  of  own  funds,  the  post-crisis 
adjustment  towards  lower  LRs  appear  to  be  relatively  sluggish  for  small 
manufacturing  firms.  


























































M_Small M_Medium M_Large GDP Growth  10
Another important indicator that provides information on the corporate finance is 
the  tangibility  of  firms’  assets  (a  proxy  for  the  collateral  level  of  firms).  Figure  4 
presents the collateral ratios measured as the ratio of the firms’ net tangible fixed assets 
to  total  assets.  Collateral  ratios  appear  to  be  increasing  with  the  size  of  the 
manufacturing  firms.  The  evidence  that  small  manufacturing  firms  have  the  lowest 
collateral ratios but not the lowest leverage ratios (Figures 2 and 4) is not consistent 
with  the  argument  that  suggests  positive  association  between  leverage  ratio  and 
tangibility and thus firm size in the Turkish case (Fan et al., 2004). As will be discussed 
later, the share of bank loans in total loans tends to be monotonically increasing with 
the firm size. It may be argued that asset tangibility is more related to bank loans rather 
than the leverage ratio per se. This may not be implausible, since the LR contains other 












Compared to the figures in Table 1, the asset tangibility in Turkey is lower than   
both the emerging market and the developed countries. According to IMF (2005, p. 
103)  “asset  tangibility  in  emerging  markets  is  50  percent  larger  than  in  the  G-3 
countries, supporting a higher level of corporate leverage”. Informational asymmetries 
between borrowers and lenders may decrease with higher asset tangibility. Therefore, 


































































All NF Firms M_Small M_Medium
M_Large Manuf.  11
higher asset tangibility may allow for higher leverage. The Turkish case, with lower 
asset tangibility and higher leverage ratios compared internationally can be interpreted 
as  providing  a  puzzle.  However,  when  we  consider  the  maturity  and  currency 
composition  of  the  debt  (see  below),  along  with  the  already  discussed  fact  that  a 
substantial part of the debt is short term trade credits, the Turkish evidence may become 
much  less  puzzling.  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  collateral  positions  of  the  Turkish 
corporate sector firms tend to be gradually improving after the financial crisis of 2001.  
 
II.2.  The Composition of the Corporate Sector Liabilities  
Figure  5 plots  the  composition  of  corporate  sector  liabilities in Turkey during 
1992-2004. The share of bank loans in corporate sector liabilities appears to be close to 
the advanced countries (G7) average (Table 1). However, such a comparison may be 
misleading  as  the  G7  group  contains  both  “market-based”  (e.g.  USA  and  UK)  and 
“bank-based”  (e.g.  Germany)  financial  systems.  Given  the  fact  that  corporate  bond 
issuance  has  virtually  no  role  in  corporate  sector  in  Turkey,  the  Turkish  financial 
system may better be compared to “bank-based” systems rather than “market-based” 
systems. Both the composition of corporate sector liabilities (Figure 5) and the share of 
bank loans in total loans (Figure 6, below) show that bank loans are not the dominant 
source of finance in Turkey. The share of bank loans in total corporate sector liabilities 
fluctuates around 20 % during the period. Considering the ratios for a typical bank-
based (e.g. Germany, 53 %) and a market based country with active securities markets 
(e.g. UK, 23%) presented in Table 1, it may be plausible to argue that bank lending to 
private sector in Turkey is rather limited and close to market-based systems. However, 
with the absence of an active and dominant corporate bond market, the Turkish firms 
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The  share  of  bank  loans  in  total  corporate  sector  liabilities  tends  to  decline 
considerably after the financial crisis of 2001. From figure 5, it may be inferred that 
the increase in the use of own funds (hence the decline in the LRs) after 2001 is 
basically due to the decline in the share of bank loans rather than the other forms of 
the debt including trade credits. This might be due to stricter prudential regulation on 
the banking system as well as firms behaving more prudent on excessive bank debt 
after  the  crisis.  However,  given  the  fact  that  the  corporate  sector  already  being 
severely bank credit constrained, such development may not be interpreted as growth 
enhancing especially in the absence of a well developed corporate bond market.  
A striking feature of the Turkish corporate sector is the high share of trade credits 
in total liabilities. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) claim that firms tend to use 
more  bank  loans  rather  than  trade  credits  in  countries  with  more efficient financial 
systems.  The  negative  relationship  between  the  development  level  and  trade  credit 
share  suggested  by  Table  1  is  consistent  with  an  argument  that  trade  credit  is  an 
important  source  of  financing  in  economies  with  underdeveloped  financial 
intermediaries.  However,  this  argument  per  se  may  not  be  sufficient  to  explain 
substantially  high  share  of  trade  credits  in  Turkey  compared  to  both  the  emerging 
market and small industrial countries by the financial development levels of countries.  
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The  presence  of  trade  credits  is  often  explained  by  information/monitoring 
advantage  of  suppliers  over  banks  in  financing  constrained  firms  (Burkart  and 
Ellingsen,  2004  and  Davis  and  Stone,  2004).  This  information  asymmetry  may  be 
expected to decrease with the level of financial development. Furthermore, suppliers 
having  access  to privileged information  about  their customers’ creditworthiness and 
ability to exert corporate control more readily than banks are often entitled to seize the 
firm’s inputs  and  other  assets in the case of a default. This can make inputs to be 
considered also as collateral worthing more to the supplier who is in the same business 
than to the bank (Frank and Maksimovic, 1998). In this context, trade credit can be a 
substitute for bank credit even for firms with sufficient debt capacity.  
Trade  credits  become  more  important  when  creditor  protection  is  weaker 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002 and Fisman and Love, 2003) and when firms 
are undercapitalized (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). For the firms with credit constraints 
and  low  asset  tangibility  (collaterally  poor),  trade  credit  becomes  an  important 
complement to bank credits. Compared to the international evidence, the Turkish firms 
appear to be highly leveraged with lower asset tangibility (see below). The high level of 
debt owes much to the trade credits the share of which in total firm liabilities almost 
equals to the share of bank credits during the sample period (see Figure 4). The lower 
asset tangibility of the Turkish firms can thus be interpreted as amongst the causes of 
trade  credit  complementary  to  bank  credit  under  financial  constraints.  The 
macroeconomic instability and persistent high inflation may also be interpreted among 
the  causes  of  short-maturity  monetary  contracts  including  trade  credits  in  Turkey
6. 
Extensive use of trade credits can be also interpreted as evidence of informal nature of 
financial structure of Turkish firms. Existing institutional framework does not prevail 
market oriented relations in the financial system and this creates its second best solution 
in  the  form  of  trade  credits  together  with  some  vulnerabilities  that  prevent  to  see 
underlying problems.  
                                                 
6 Türkan (2004) claim that high taxes on financial intermediation makes bank finance expensive and thus 
lead to extensive use of trade credits in Turkey. Yalçın et al. (2005) find that small firms have the highest 
share of trade credits in total liabilities compared to other firm groups where large firms act as financial 
intermediaries.    14
II.3.  Bank Loans  
In  Turkey,  both  the  levels  of  financial  deepening  and  the  banking  system 
preference  to  finance  corporate  sector  are  very  low  leading  corporate  sector  to  be 
severely  bank-credit  constraint.  Figure  6  plots  the  2003  values  of  the  ratios  of  the 
private credit by deposit money banks (DMB) and other financial institutions
7 to GDP 
(CREDIT/GDP), private credit by DMB to GDP (BANK_CREDIT/GDP) and DMB 
assets to GDP (BANK_ASSET/GDP) for a large sample of developed and developing 
countries. The figure also plots a Bank Credit Allocation Index (BCAI) measured as the 
ratio of deposit money banks credits to private sector to deposit money banks assets. 
According  to  BANK_ASSET/GDP,  the  level  of  bank/financial  intermediation  in 
Turkey is relatively low
8. The bank credit allocation index for Turkey computed as 0.35 
appears to be among the least three (along with Algeria and Argentina) in a sample of 
75 countries. Accordingly, only around 35% of deposit money banking system assets 
are allocated to corporate sector in Turkey
9. Note that, only ten countries have BCAI 
lower than 0.6 and more than one-third of the countries have BCAI higher than 0.9. As 
will be discussed later, the extremely low level of banking system preference to finance 
corporate sector can be attributed to financial crowding out of government debt finance 
via commercial banking system in Turkey after the mid 1980s. Given the relatively low 
levels  of  financial development and banking system preference to finance corporate 
sector,  the  ratio  of  private  credit  by  financial  institutions  to  GDP  (CREDIT/GDP) 
appears to be very low (amongst the lowest 4 in the cross country sample) in Turkey. 
As  can  be  observed  from  the  differences  of  the  CREDIT/GDP  and 
BANK_CREDIT/GDP  values,  non-bank  financial  institutions  are  also  important 
                                                 
7  The  other  financial  institutions  comprise  banklike  and  nonbank  financial  (insurance  companies, 
provident  and  pension  funds,  trust  and  custody  accounts,  pooled  investment  schemes,  compulsory 
savings schemes) institutions. These are institutions that serve as financial intermediaries, while not 
incurring liabilities usable as means of payment. All the data for Figure 5 are from the World Bank 
Financial Development and Structure 2005 Dataset, See, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000) for a 
detailed description of the database.  
8 Note that a similar picture arises when we consider the ratio of liquid liabilities (currency plus demand 
and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and other financial intermediaries) to GDP which is the broadest 
available indicator of financial intermediation and a typical measure of financial depth (Beck et al. 2000).  
9 These findings are consistent with those reported in Sy (2005), Hauner (2006) and Hanson (2003) 
suggesting that Turkey appears to have the highest ratio of government securities in total banking system 
assets amongst a large number of developing and industrial countries. We discuss this issue in Section 
III.1 in more detail.     15
sources  of  credit  to  corporate  sector  for  a number  of  countries  including the  USA, 
S:Arabia, Canada, Iran, Malaysia, Korea and Thailand
10. In Turkey, the share of non-
bank  financial  institutions  in  credits  is somewhat negligible  (5.1  %).  Consequently, 
corporate  sector  in Turkey can be characterised as suffering from a general finance 
constraint in Turkey. 
Figure 7 reports the average share of bank loans in total loans for non- financial 
firms. Given the fact that the corporate sector, in general, suffers from a bank credit 
constraint, the figure may be helpful in assessing the evolution of the share of bank 
finance  over  time  and  across  firm  groups.  The  share  of  bank  loans  appears  to  be 
monotonically  increasing  with  the  firm  size.  The  figure  also  suggests  a  tendency 
through a general improvement in bank loans until 1997-1998. After 1998 the bank 
loans  tend  to  decline  until  a  slight  improvement  after  2002  with  macroeconomic 
stability.  It  is  worth  noting  that,  unlike  the  recent  2001  financial  crisis,  we  do  not 
observe a severe bank credit squeeze (except for small firms in 1994 to certain extend) 
during and after the 1994 crisis. Compared to large firms, small and medium sized 
manufacturing  firms  appear  to  be  somewhat  more  negatively  affected  from  the 
worsening bank credit conditions. The overall picture suggests that the access of small 
sized  manufacturing  firms  to  bank  finance  appears  to  be  more  sensitive  to  general 
squeezes in  bank  credits.  The observation that small firms use less bank finance is 
consistent with the results of Beck et al. (2005) based on cross-country data.   
                                                 
10  Non-bank  financial  institutions  provide  64%  of  private  credits  in  the  USA.  Other  notable 
countries are S. Arabia (50%), Canada (31%), Iran (29%), Malaysia (29%), Korea (24%), Thailand (20 





















































































































































































































































II.4. Maturity, Interest Rate and Currency Risks of the Corporate Sector  
II.4.1. Maturity and Interest Rate Risks 
High  short-term  debt  may  make  firms  be  more  vulnerable  to  insolvency  and 
rollover  risk  especially  in  the  case  of  an  interest  rate  shocks  as  cash  flow  must  be 
available for interest payments. Figure 8 presents the maturity structure of the corporate 
sector debt measured as the ratio of short-term liabilities to total debt. The bulk of the 
Turkish corporate sector debt appears to be short-term (with maturity less than a year). 
The corporate debt maturity tends to increase with firm size. From the figure, it may be 
inferred that there has been a tendency towards an improvement in the maturity structure 
after the mid-1990s. However, as will be discussed later, this owes much to increased 
liability dollarisation, which allowed firms to borrow in foreign currency with a relatively 
longer maturity during the period. Consistent with an argument that the debt structure of 
firms  may  not  be  invariant  to  their  tangibility,  firms  with  greater  collateral  can  be 
expected  obtain  longer-term  debt.   As  we  have  shown  in  Figure  4,  asset  tangibility 
increases with firm size, similarly as shown in Figure 8, debt maturity tend to increase 
with firm size and thus with asset tangibility. 
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Figure 9 plots the short-term debt (ST) ratios for East Asian, Latin American and 
Eastern  European  and  Turkish  non-financial  firms.  The  debt  maturity  of  the  Turkish 
corporate sector appears to be relatively short compared to international evidence. Based 
on  a  cross-country  data  for  5344  firms  of 39  countries  during  1991-2001,  Fan  et  al. 
(2004)  compute  that  the  median  short-term  debt  ratios  for  developing  and  developed 
economies are 65% and 45%, respectively. According to IMF (2005a, p.118), the ratio of 
short-term debt to total debt in percentage for “market participants” (non-participants) is 
35.7 (51.7) for emerging market countries, 29.4 (44.0) for Latin America, 39.1 (51.3) for 
Asia and 38.5 (60.0) for Europe. In the IMF sample, Turkey has the highest short-term 
debt  ratio  (55.3  for  market  participants  and  65.5  for  non-participants)  among  the 
developing countries considered. Although the IMF (2005) figures are somewhat smaller 
than those in Figure 8, potentially due to the very limited sample size of IMF (2005a), the 
Turkish firms can be interpreted to rely more on short-term debt leading them to be more 
vulnerable to shocks. According to Bleakley and Cowan (2004) and IMF (2005a), the 
higher short-term debt ratios can lead firms to be more liquid due to the potential risks 
stemming from maturity mismatches. The figures in Table 1 suggest that the Turkish 
firms appear to have similar liquidity ratios with those of the industrial countries where 
the corporate sectors in these countries can borrow more in longer maturities and in terms 
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of their domestic currencies. Therefore, the liquidity ratio of the Turkish corporate sector 
firms may be interpreted as yet to offset their greater vulnerability to shocks. This may be 
plausible because of the high cost of remaining liquid in the face of the sustained high 
inflation rates during the period.
11 In Section III.2, we discuss this issue in detail in the 










Sources: Turkey: CBRT, others: Ratha et al., (2003).  
 
 
The relatively short maturity and high level of corporate debt in Turkey make firms 
be vulnerable to insolvency as cash flow must be available for interest payments. Figure 
10 reports interest coverage ratio (ICR) measured as the ratio of profit before interest and 
tax to interest expenses. ICR can be taken as a proxy for firms’ ability to service debt as 
debt  service  default  risk  tends  to  decrease  with  higher  earnings  relative  to  interest 
payments.
12  Firms  with  an  ICR  below  100%  can  be  interpreted  as  being  not  able  to 
generate  sufficient cash flow to service their short-term debt. Note that this does not 
                                                 
11  Bleakley  and  Cowan  (2004)  suggest  a  positive  relationship  between  short-term  indebtedness  and 
liquidity and show that while East Asian firms tended to have more short-term debt than Latin American 
companies,  their  short-term  liabilities  were  generally  matched  with  larger  holdings  of  liquid  assets. 
However, the opportunity cost of liquidity, which is ignored by Bleakley and Cowan (2004), may not be 
the same for the countries in the presence of substantially differing inflation rates.  
12 We consider the ICR definition of the CBRT Company Sector Accounts. See Claessens, Djankov and 
Nenova (2001) and Glen (2004) for alternative interest coverage ratio definitions and comparable data for a 
broad number of countries including Turkey.  
Figure 9. ST Liabilities (% of Total)



















necessarily imply a debt default as firms can temporarily use alternative sources of cash 
via asset sales or new security issues etc. (Glen, 2004).  As a Ponzi type debt finance is 
not sustainable for a firm, an ICR of at least 100%, however, is ultimately needed for the 
solvency of a firm.  
According to Figure 10 interest coverage ratios tend to improve with firm size. The 
ICRs for small and medium sized manufacturing industry firms were at critical levels 
during the financial crisis year of 2001. The small (and to a certain extend medium) sized 
manufacturing  firms,  on  average,  can  be  interpreted  as  being  highly  vulnerable  to 
insolvency even years before the crisis potentially due to the high real interest rates during the 
period. The value of the ICR for large firms just being around 100% may suggest that also 
a sizeable number of large firms found themselves facing a debt service difficulty during 
2001.  All  firm  groups  generally  tend  to  improve  their  financial  positions  after  the 
financial crisis of 2001. The post crisis adjustment of the non-manufacturing and large 
manufacturing firms appears to be remarkable. However, relatively sluggish post crisis 
adjustments of the small and medium sized manufacturing firms make them still highly 
vulnerable to interest rate shocks. With an ICR of just around 100%, the interest rate risk 
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II.4.2. Currency Risk and Liability Dollarisation 
The  presence  of  liability  dollarisation  can  make  firms  financially  vulnerable  to 
external shocks through balance sheet currency/maturity mismatches and limit the scope 
of macroeconomic policies especially by causing “fear of floating” as widely discussed in 
the recent literature.
13 Furthermore, as noted by IMF (2005, p. 116) “both currency and 
maturity  mismatches  can  exacerbate  the  impact  of  exogenous  shocks  in  emerging 
markets, increase the severity of crises, and slow down the post crisis adjustment”.
14 The 
financial  fragility  is  expected to be more severe for low-exporting non-tradable firms 
which are highly leveraged in foreign currency debt although their revenues are primarily 
in domestic currency.   
Figure  11  plots  the  ratio  of  foreign  currency  (FX)  debt  to  total  debt 
(FX_Debt/T_Debt) as a measure of corporate sector liability dollarisation in Turkey. The 
figure also presents the ratio of short-term FX debt to total FX debt as a proxy of FX debt 
maturity mismatch. The corporate sector liability dollarisation, which was already high in 
1992, sharply increased during 1992-1996 reaching a level of around 70% in 1996. After 
1996,  the  dollarisation  ratio  fluctuated  slightly  and  reached  local  peaks  with  the 
implementation and collapse of the fixed exchange rate based stabilisation policy after 
1999. The relative improvement of the macroeconomic conditions after 2001 appears to 
be effective in reducing liability dollarisation around to a level of 1996, albeit which is 
still a very high one. The data for 2005 are yet to be available, but the sustained and 
                                                 
13 For the recent accounts, see Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2004), Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004), 
Cowan, Hansen and Herrera (2005), IMF (2005) and the references cited therein.   
14 As acknowledged also by the IMF (2005, p.116) the presence of original sin (the inability of most 
countries  to  borrow  internationally  in  their  own  currencies)  indeed  “prevents  both  emerging  market 
sovereigns and corporates from issuing domestic currency debt abroad”. The inability of many countries to 
borrow in domestic currency at long maturities and fixed rates even at home constitutes the domestic 
dimension of the original sin (Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza, 2003). An important consequence of 
the original sin is neatly summarized by IMF (2005, p. 116): “an emerging market firm that is unable to 
obtain long term funding locally faces a trade-off between financing long-term investments with short term 
local currency liabilities, which creates a maturity mismatch, or borrowing long-term in foreign currency, 
which creates a currency mismatch”.  The results by Özmen and Arınsoy (2005, p. 599) suggest that 
“flexible exchange rates and strong macroeconomic policy stance with sound institutions are necessary but 
not sufficient for redemption from original sin”. Consequently, it may be argued that better governance and 
macroeconomic stability with a flexible exchange rate regime can plausably have a role in decreasing 
maturity and currency mismatches in developing countries.  
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improved macroeconomic stability during the period can plausibly be expected to yield a 
relatively lower level of corporate sector liability dollarisation. The bulk of the FX debt 
(more than 80%) appears to be short-term until 2000. The relative improvement of the 
FX  debt  maturity  with  the  stabilisation  policy  of  2000  seems  not  to  be  substantially 
distorted even with the financial crash of 2001 potentially due to the credibility of the 
post-crisis  stabilisation  programme.  Although  there  have  been  some  signs  of 
improvements, the maturity structure and especially the level of corporate sector liability 
dollarisation can be interpreted still as a source of concern leading firms vulnerable to 
external shocks.  
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The corporate sector liability dollarisation in Turkey can be interpreted as extremely 
high when compared internationally. According to IMF (2005a, p. 118), the 1999-2003 
averages of the corporate sector FX debt as percentage of total debt are 33.6 for Latin 
America, 23.0 for Asia, 20.4 for Europe and 25.7 for all emerging market countries in the 
sample. The Latin American countries appear to have the highest liability dollarisation 
ratio.  To  have  a  better  international  comparison,  we  consider  the  Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB) database, which is used also a basic source for IMF (2005a). 
The  IADB  database  provides  firm-level  information  for  approximately  2,000  non-  23
financial firms from ten Latin American countries for the period of 1990–2002.
15 Figure 
12 plots the liability dollarisation ratios (FX debt as a percent of total debt) for non-
financial firms in the Latin America and Turkey. Turkey (along with Uruguay) appears to 
be amongst the most dollarised countries whilst the liability dollarisation for Colombia, 
Chile and Brazil can be interpreted as relatively modest.
16 The liability dollarisation tends 
to be relatively persistent for most of the countries during the period. Consistent with the 
argument  in which fixed exchange rate regimes encourage dollarisation, the countries 
with  hard  pegs  (Argentina)  and  de  facto  (Reinhart  and  Rogoff,  2004)  crawling  pegs 
(Bolivia,  Costa  Rica,  Peru,  Uruguay  and  Venezuela)  are  generally  more  dollarised 
compared to the countries with floating exchange rate regimes (Brazil, Chile, Colombia) 
over the sample period. It is worth noting that the countries with lower dollarisation ratios 
are  also  the  countries  enforced  strict  regulations  on  financial  transactions  in  foreign 
currency (Brazil, Chile, Colombia and to a certain extent Mexico, see Singh et al., 2005 
Chapter VI for financial dollarisation and regulations in Latin America). Therefore, the 
impact of exchange rate regime inflexibility on dollarisation should better be interpreted 
with  a  caution.  The  Turkish  experience,  in  this context,  is  more  unique  as  corporate 
sector liability dollarisation has been the highest in spite of substantial shifts in exchange 
rate  regimes  over  the  period.  This  may  indeed  show  also  the  importance  of  strong 
macroeconomic  policy  stance  and  price  stability  for  an  endogenous  dedollarisation 
process (Galindo and Leiderman, 2005) along with precautionary/regulatory measures to 
limit vulnerabilities caused by dollarisation.
17   
.
                                                 
15 See Kamil (2004) for a detailed information on the IADB database. The December (2003) issue of the 
Emerging Markets Review is entirely devoted to studies using the IADB database (see, Galindo et al., 2003 
for a review). The database covering around 2000 firms for 10 countries is one of the most comprehensive 
source for firm level liability dollarisation capital structure. It is worth noting that the CBRT Company 
Sector database covers a wide range of information for around 8000 firms annually after 1990.    
16 Note that, as Kamil (2004) warns that the number of firms for Uruguay is very small (less than 30 for 
most of the years) and thus may not be clearly representative. The small sample size problem is the case 
also for Venezuela and Costa Rica.   
17 See Kesriyeli et al. (2005) for the causes and balance sheet consequences of the liability dollarisation of 
non-financial sectors in Turkey. The results by Kesriyeli et al. (2005) suggest that both sector-specific and 
macroeconomic condition variables are significant in explaining the corporate sector liability dollarisation. 
Firms are found to match only partially the currency composition of their debt with their income streams 
making them potentially vulnerable to negative balance sheet affects of real exchange rate depreciation 
shocks.   24
 
II.5.  Corporate Sector Vulnerabilities and the Post-Crisis Adjustment 
The analysis so for suggests that the non-financial firms in Turkey has been heavily 
exposed almost all of the basic balance sheet risks. The corporate sector appears to be 
excessively leveraged with relatively lower asset tangibility creating also a credit risk for 
the lenders (basically banks). The figures for the maturity and currency composition of 
the corporate sector debt show that firms rely heavily on foreign currency denominated 
and  short-term  debt  instruments  in  Turkey.  Such  a  liability  composition  makes  firms 
vulnerable to both exchange rate and interest rate shocks through currency and maturity 
mismatches. Interest rate increases may potentially lead to a rollover risk and a decline in 
the  net  worth  of  the  firms  with  higher  short-term  debt  magnifying  the  conventional 
interest rate channel as postulated by the financial accelerator mechanism (Bernanke, 
Gertler and Gilcrist, 1999). Real exchange rate depreciations, whilst can potentially make 
exporting firms more competitive, can negatively affect the balance sheets of firms that 
do  not  produce  tradable  goods  and  thus  can  not  hedge  against  exchange  rate  risks 
(Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee, 2001). The results by Kesriyeli et al. (2005), indeed, 
suggest that firms in Turkey match only partially the currency composition of their debt 
with their income streams making them vulnerable to negative balance sheet affects of 
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real  exchange  rate  depreciation  shocks.  The  high  level  of  leverage  ratios  (or,  the 
relatively  higher  debt-equity  ratios  reflecting  a  capital  structure  mismatch)  in  Turkey 
during  the  period  can  be  expected  to  be  an  amplifying  factor  for  the  financial 
vulnerability arising from currency and maturity mismatches.   
Consistent with the recent balance sheet approach to financial crisis, the fragilities 
of the corporate sector are found to be crucially important in triggering and determining 
the  output  cost  of  the  2001  crisis  in  Turkey  (Roubini  and  Setser,  2004;  Koğar  and 
Özmen, 2005; and Keller and Lane, 2005). In this context we consider the developments 
in the basic balance sheet items that potentially reflects fragility before, during and after 
the 2001 financial crisis. The diamond-shaped chart plotted in Figure 13 summarises the 
LRs, interest coverage risk ratio (ICRR = 100/ICR), liability dollarisation (FXD/TD) and 
short-term  debt  (Short  Term  Debt/Total  Debt)  ratios  (all  are  in  percentage  form)  as 
indicators for manufacturing firms fragility during 1996-2004.
18  
 
Figure 13. Corporate Sector Vulnerabilities
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18 The ratios for the other non-financial firms showed a simmilar pattern with those for the manufacturing 
industry firms, therefore not plotted to save the space.    26
The interest coverage risk increased sharply with the financial crisis of 2001 owing 
both to the high leverage ratios and the jump in the interest rates. The risk decreased 
sharply  after  2001  even  much  below  to  the  1996-2000  average  with  the  decline  in 
nominal and real interest rates. The leverage ratios improved only slightly during 2002-
2004 compared to the earlier periods. The major improvement in the LRs was observed 
in 2004 as discussed earlier in the context of Figure 2. Liability dollarisation and short-
term debt maturity, however, tend to be persistent even after the 2001 crisis making firms 
still  extremely  exposed  to  currency  and  interest  rate  risks.  The  monetary  policy 
credibility with price stability and better macroeconomic stance after the 2001 crisis has 
been influential in reducing the LRs and ICRR and thus the interest rate and debt rollover 
risks considerably. Currency composition of debt and its maturity which are potentially 
sourced  from  the  inertia  of  liability  dollarisation  and  the  relatively  lower  level  of 
financial intermediation, respectively, however still remain as important sources of risk 
for the non-financial firms in Turkey.  
 
III.1. Domestic Public Debt Finance and Financial Crowding-Out   
A well-developed government securities market is often considered as helpful for 
the  development  of  a  corporate  bond  market  as  it  can  provide  the  necessary  market 
infrastructure  and  investor  base  along  with  a  reliable  benchmark  yield  curve  (IMF, 
2005a,b).  Government  bonds  and  securities,  especially  those  with  short  maturities, 
provide liquidity services and can be used as financial collateral. As Woodford (1990) 
and Holmstorm and Tirole (1998) convincingly show government debt as net wealth may 
thus  crowd-in  private  investment  by  relaxing  liquidity  constraint  in  non-Ricardian 
economies with imperfect financial intermediation. However, these beneficial effects of 
the government debt finance instruments may not be invariant to financial depth and to 
the debt level (thus the sustainability) and the through which public sector borrows. High 
levels of government borrowing from domestic markets may drain limited sources for 
investment. The impact of such a financial crowding out might be more severe for bank 
dependent firms when the public heavily borrows from the commercial banks.
19 In an 
                                                 
19 Financial deepening and banking system development can potentially limit the crowding out affect 
(Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2004). However, as Kuttner and Lown (1999) shows, bank holdings of   27
environment where financial markets are relatively shallow, over-barrowing by the public 
sector may easily crowd out private sector activity as substantially large shares of public 
debt  in  the  domestic  financial  system  may  reduce  the  overall  liquidity  as  a  result  of 
increasing the country risk premium and thus reducing capital inflows (Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy, 2004). In such a case, fiscal contractions can be expansionary as they 
alleviate the credit constraint of firms.  
Considering the overall benefits and costs of the government domestic debt finance, 
it may be argued that there is an endogenous threshold beyond which an increase of it 
may cause financial crowding out. The threshold is expected to increase with financial 
deepening, the development of a corporate sector bond market, better governance and 
sound  macroeconomic  policy  stance.  Consistent  with  the  recent  “debt  intolerance” 
arguments (Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano, 2003), the threshold is expected to be lower 
in developing countries. Beyond the threshold level of the debt finance, expansionary 
fiscal policies can indeed be contractionary as it can lead to financial crowding out and 
even to a lower financial depth
20.   
The low levels of financial intermediation and the banking system preference to 
finance corporate sector are already discussed as amongst the major causes of the firms’ 
financial constraints in Turkey. Bank-based financial system in Turkey that is not deep 
compared to those of the countries with similar development levels (Figure 6 in Section 
II.3), appears to prefer to finance public deficits with its rather limited sources. Relatively 
low share of bank loans in liabilities of corporate sector may be attributed to financial 
crowding out of government debt finance via the commercial banking system in Turkey.  
In Turkey, high and persistent fiscal deficits have often been interpreted as one of 
the major sources of macroeconomic instability and chronic inflation sustained for more 
than three decades. Before the financial crisis of 2001, the share of the public debt in 
GDP was not very high with total debt (external and domestic) reaching just around 50% 
                                                                                                                                                              
public debt tend to displace lending to the non-bank private sector even in a country like the US with well 
developed financial markets.   
20This  can  be  interpreted  as  being  perfectly  consistent  with  the  “expansionary  fiscal  contractions” 
arguments in the literature. See Giavazzi et al., 2000 for a survey and  Favero and Giavazzi, 2004 and 
Özatay, 2005 for the Brazilian and Turkish evidence, respectively.    28
in 2000
21. However, the basic problem has been its mode of financing. After the financial 
liberalization  programme  of  1980,  financing  domestic  debt  via  deposit  money  banks 
(DMBs) has become the major mode, especially after the mid-1980s. During the period, 
DMBs absorbed around 80-90% of the Treasury cash security issuances in the primary 
market. Given the relatively lower level of financial depth, the growth of the public debt 
and the consequent heavier reliance on domestic debt finance through the banks after the 
late 1990s have yielded high real interest rates and extremely short debt maturities, thus 
has led to an interest payments explosion
22.  
Figure 14 plots the shares of government securities (PUB/TA) and credits to private 
sector (PRIV/TA) in total assets (TA) of deposit money banks (DMBs) in Turkey during 
1990-2004.  The  figure  plots  also  the  ratios  of  the  DMBs  government  securities 
(PUB/GDP),  private  sector  credits  (PRIV/GDP)  and  total  assets  (TA/GDP)  to  GDP 
during the period. Note that, the substantial rise in the government securities share in 
2001 is due to the fiscal cost of the financial crisis arising from government contingent 
liabilities and bank bail outs.  
 
                                                 
21 With the 2001 financial crisis, however, public debt increased sharply due to the public sector contingent 
liabilities and the realisation of the fragilities of the banking system under government bailout guarantees as 
prospective public sector deficits (Koğar and Özmen, 2006).  The values for the total public debt stock 
(domestic debt) as a percent of GDP were 102 (69) in 2001, 90 (55) in 2002, 80 (55) in 2003 and 75 (53) in 
2004.  
22 Interest payments on domestic debt (as a percent of GDP) increased from 2.4 in 1990 and to 10.6 in 1998 
and to 15 in 2000. After the crises it reached 23 per cent of GDP by the end of 2001 and gradually 
declining thereafter with around 19 % in 2002, 16 % in 2003 and 13 % in 2004.  See Özatay (1997) and 
Özmen and Koğar (1998)  for the earlier studies on the Turkish public sector deficits finance before the 
crisis. Özatay and Sak (2003) and Koğar and Özmen (2006) are among the studies discussing the role of  
the mode of the domestic debt finance in triggerring the financial crisis of 2001.     29
Figure 14. Government Securities and  Private Sector Credits 




















































































By definition, over-borrowing of the public sector is expected to financially crowd 
out  private  sector  credit  if  it  is  not  accommodated  with  a  corresponding  growth  of 
banking  system  assets.  From  the  figure,  it  may  be  inferred  that,  the  government 
borrowing from the commercial banking system helped indeed financial deepening until 
the mid 1990s. This may be plausible given the fact that the government borrowing from 
DMBs  was  relatively  moderate  and  the  monetary  policy  stance  was  largely 
accommodative  with  no  effective  control  on  the  growth  of  the  monetary  aggregates 
during  the  period.  This  is  indeed  consistent  with  the  view  that  public  debt  finance 
provides  liquidity  and  thus  can  crowd  in  private  sector  investment  by  relaxing  the 
liquidity  constraint  under  market  imperfections  (Woodford,  1990  and  Holmstorm  and 
Tirole, 1998). However, the threshold level of domestic debt finance beyond which it 
leads to crowding out appears to be somewhat reached after the mid 1990s. The heavier 
reliance on the debt finance through the banks with the growth of public debt has begun 
to severely crowd out private credits by the late 1990s. After 1999, the banking system 
assets as a percent of GDP tend to remain stagnant (even decline after the crisis) despite 
substantial increase in government borrowing.
23 The Turkish commercial banking system 
                                                 
23 This is consistent with the view that, “continuously large public sector borrowing from the domestic 
banking sector can have substantial adverse implications for financial development” (Hauner, 2006, p. 3).   30
appears to allocate around 40% of its assets to public debt finance during the 2000s.
24 
Despite  the  severe  fiscal  contractions  and  a  credible  monetary  policy  stance  with 
substantially decreased inflation rates after the 2001 crisis, the fiscal dominance on the 
commercial banking system tends to be persistent. This is a crucially important policy 
issue  for  sustainable  growth  and  financial  stability  since  the  domestic  debt  finance 
through the DMBs not only creates a direct fragility linkage between the balance sheets 
of  the  public  and  banking  sectors  but  also  leads  non-financial  corporate sector  to  be 
severely  bank  credit  constrained  (and  thus  financially  constrained  in  the  absence  of 
corporate sector bond markets) due to the financial crowding out. 
 
III.2.  Financial  Asset  Holdings  of  Non-Financial  Firms  under  Macroeconomic 
Uncertainty 
Non-financial firms hold financial assets including government securities to hedge 
themselves  against  liquidity  and  interest  rate  risks  and  maturity  mismatches.
25  In  the 
conventional Modigliani and Miller (1958) world with perfect complete markets firms 
can raise funds instantaneously to finance their profitable projects and thus they may 
have no uncertainty induced precautionary demand for liquidity. However, as Holmstorm 
and Tirole (2000) argue, the presence of credit rationing, informational constraints and 
moral hazard may increase a demand for liquidity. The most liquid financial asset in the 
firms’ portfolio is their cash balances the demand for which can be explained by the 
                                                                                                                                                              
The decline in the total bank assets to GDP ratio during the 2000s supports also the argument that “rising 
share of public debt to private assets … reduces financial depth” (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2004, p. 1) 
24 This is, indeed, an extremely high ratio when compared internationally. The Turkish experience appears 
to be an outlier according to the figures reported in Sy (2005), Hauner (2006) and Hanson (2003). Sy 
(2005, Table 1) reports the 2003 values of the shares of government securities in total banking system 
assets for a number of developing and industrial countries. The mean share for the 24 country sample is 
13% and the Turkish banking system has the highest government securities ratio (37%) representing an 
outlier (along with India and Indonesia with the shares 32% and 31%, respectively). In the same vein, 
Hauner (2006, Table A1) reports the 2001-2003 average shares of the banks’ credits to public sector in 
their  total  credits  for  a  sample of 75 developing countries. Accordingly, the credits the public sector 
constitute around 65% of total bank credits in Turkey representing one of the highest when compared 
internationally. According to Hanson (2003) Turkey appears to have the highest ratio of banking system net 
government credit to deposits amongst 25 developing countries with the largest banking systems. 
25 Non-financial corporate sector firms hold substantial amounts of liquid financial assets in many countries 
(Dittmar et al., 2003 and IMF, 2006).  According to IMF (2006), the recent acceleration of the liquid 
financial asset holdings of the firms in the G-/ countries is one of the striking changes in the global 
financial landscape. According to IMF (2006, p.135), since the early 2000s, “companies in many industrial 
countries  have  moved  from  their  traditional  position  of  borrowing  funds  to  finance  their  capital 
expenditures to running financial surpluses that they are now lending to other sectors of the economy”.   31
conventional  transactions  (Tobin,  1958)  and  precautionary  (Miller  and  Orr,  1966) 
motives. Firms’ cash balances, in this context, reduce transactions costs and provide a 
buffer to absorb adverse shocks (Keynes, 1936). Not only cash balances but also cash-
like liquid assets including interest bearing bank deposits and short-term securities can 
provide a financial buffer to absorb unexpected changes in transactions and investment 
opportunities. Higher uncertainty sourced by macroeconomic instability may increase the 
demand for financial assets instead of investing these resources into long-term investment 
projects.  In  this  context,  the  firms’  demand  for  financial  assets  in  general  may  be 
considered as due to their transactions/precautionary-cum-speculative motives.
26  
Figures 15 and 16 plot the shares of government securities and total financial assets 
(bank  deposits,  government  securities  and  repurchase  agreements)  in  current  assets 
during 1996-2004, respectively.
27 The shares of government securities (GS) and financial 
assets (FA) tend to increase with firm size in manufacturing industry. The firms’ holding 
of  government  securities  tend  to  decline  gradually  during  the  period  until  the  2001 
financial  crisis.  After  the  crisis,  the  share  of  government  securities  in  current  assets 
appears to be remained stable at relatively lower levels. The firms’ holdings of financial 
assets, on the other hand, tend to be stable during the whole period. Especially large sized 
manufacturing firms invest more heavily in financial assets.  
 
                                                 
26 There is now a growing body of  theoretical and empirical literature attempting to explain non-financial firms 
demand for financial assets and liquidity. The recent contributions include Opler et al. (1999), Holmstorm and Tirole 
(2000), Dittmar et al. (2003), Almeida et al. (2004), Özkan and Özkan (2004), IMF (2006) and Baum et al. (2006).  
Kaplan et al. (2006) provide a recent survey of the literature and an empirical application to the Turkish case.  
27 The share of current assets in total assets typically constitutes around a half of the total assets with exhibiting 
negligible variation across firm groups and time periods. Therefore, dividing the numbers in Figures 15 and 16 by 
two gives a broad measure proximating the shares in terms of total assets.    32
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The FA holding of the manufacturing firms in Turkey is not low when compared 
internationally.
28 However, the firms’ holdings of cash (typically less than 0.5% of their 
current assets) have been minimal during the period. Under chronic high inflation rates, 
economic agents, including non-financial firms, can be expected to minimise their cash 
(and non-interest bearing demand deposits) holdings.
29 A sustained severe inflationary 
process in a country may not only preclude domestic fiat money demanded as a store of 
value, but may also reduce its role as a medium of exchange with the availability of 
alternative  liquid  financial  assets  which  can  be  used  as  an  inflation  hedge  whilst 
providing liquidity to a certain extent. This may plausibly explain the minimal holdings 
                                                 
28 For example, Baum et al. (2006) report that US and Germany corporations hold around 10% and 6% of 
their total assets in liquid financial assets (cash and marketable securities), respectively. Dittmar et al. (2003) 
consider a cross-section of firms from 45 countries and find that the median ratio of liquid financial assets to 
net assets (total assets minus cash and marketable securities) is  6.6 %. The median liquid financial asset ratio 
reported by Dittmar et al. (2003) for some selected countries are as follows: 3.1% (Chile), 6.4% (US), 7.3% 
(Brasil), 7.4% (Germany), 8.1% (UK), 11.1% (France), 13.4% (Turkey), 15.5% (Japan), and 20.9% ( Israel).  
In the same vein, Himmelberg et al. (2003) consider a cross-section of firms from 27 European countries and 
find that the mean (median) ratio of liquid financial assets to net assets is  18.0 % (6.4%). The data sets by 
Dittmar et al. (2003) and Himmelberg et al. (2003) both show that the liquid financial asset ratio varies 
widely  across  (and  within)  countries.  This  suggest  that  there  may  be  no  optimal  liquidity  ratio  for 
nonfinancial firms invariant to industry/firm specific characteristics and the prevailing policy stance in the 
country. A companion paper, Kaplan, Özmen and Yalçın (2006), empirically investigate the causes and 
consequences of  the financial asset holdings of the non-financial firms in Turkey.  
29 There is no data  for the firms’ holding of demand deposits with banks. However, it may be plausably 
expected  that  the  share  of  domestic  currency  denominated  demand  deposits  is  minimal  as  for  the  cash 
holdings under the severe inflationary period.    33
of cash by the firms. However, the fact that the FA holdings of the Turkish firms is 
roughly  comparable  with  those  for  the  countries  enjoying  much  lower  inflation  and 
stronger macroeconomic policy stance needs a further explanation.  
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The liability structures of the firms, including maturity and currency composition of 
their debt, are among the important determinants of their demand for liquid assets. A 
short-term debt dominated structure forces the firm to be more liquid whilst long-term 
debt allows it to be more flexible against liquidity shocks. A firm whose liabilities is 
made up of mainly foreign currency denominated short-term debt and whose earnings are 
mainly  in  domestic  currency  tends  to  liquidate FX  assets against  a  currency  risk.  As 
already discussed in the earlier sections, the bulk of the corporate sector firms’ debt in 
Turkey  have  been  short  term  and  denominated  in  foreign  currency  that  make  firms 
vulnerable against shocks. The opportunity costs of remaining liquid by holding TL cash 
and TL denominated demand deposits have been very high in the face of the sustained 
high inflation rates until very recently. Under these conditions, firms may need to hold 
alternative liquid financial assets to avoid underlying risks.  
Given  the  fact  that  the  maturity  of  financial  contracts,  including  government 
securities and banking system time deposits, has been extremely short in Turkey (Koğar 
and  Özmen,  2006),  non-financial  firms  tend  to  hold  interest  bearing  FA  also  for 
satisfying their liquidity needs. The Turkish banking system is heavily dollarised with FX   34
denominated deposits constituting around a half of the total deposits during the period 
(Yılmaz,  2005  and  Akıncı,  Barlas-Özer  and  Usta,  2006).  Consequently,  non-financial 
firms in Turkey have been able to hedge themselves against currency risk to a certain 
extent and to remain relatively liquid by holding FX deposits with the banking system.  
The  firms’  demand  for  liquid  assets  depends  also  on  the  degree  of  financial 
constraints  that  they  face  up  with  (Opler  et  al.  1999  and  Özkan  and  Özkan,  2004). 
Financially  more  constrained  firms  are  expected  to  hold  more  liquid  assets  for 
precautionary reasons as it may be more difficult for them to borrow when needed. The 
degree  of  a  financial  constraint  may  decrease  with  firm  size  as  large  firms  can  have 
access to capital markets and face a lower degree of asymmetric information problems 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). Consequently, we may expect that small firms tend to hold 
more  liquid  assets  as  a  financial  buffer  to  hedge  against  negative  shocks  (the 
precautionary-cum-transactions motive). However, the Turkish evidence suggests that the  
FA  holdings  tend  to  increase  with  firm  size  in  manufacturing  industry  which  is  not 
consistent with these arguments (Figure 16). This contrasting evidence may, however, be 
justified if FA are viewed not only as financial buffers against liquidity shocks but also as 
a portfolio choice substituting fixed investments.  
Non-financial firms face a choice between allocating their resources into fixed and 
financial investments (Vickers, 1987 and Holmstorm and Tirole, 2000). By providing the 
necessary  liquidity  services  due  to  the  transactions-cum-precautionary  motive,  liquid 
financial assets can be complementary to fixed investments. In this context, the holding 
of liquid financial assets including government securities can crowd in fixed investments 
(Woodford,  1990  and  Holmstorm  and  Tirole,  1998).  However,  under  macroeconomic 
instability  and  thus  high  uncertainty,  non-financial  firms  may  prefer  to  defer  fixed 
investments and hold financial assets also for their speculative motive. In such a case, 
financial  assets  and  fixed  investments  may  become  substitutes  leading  the  former  to 
crowd out the latter.
30,31 
                                                 
30 Such a financial crowding-out behaviour under uncertainty is neatly propsed by Vickers (1987): “Money 
may  be  held  when  the  uncertainties  surrounding  economic  prospects  make  it  desirable  to  defer  the 
commitment of resources to real investment and the pursuit of real economic activities. To the extent that this 
is so, available real resources will not be utilized as fully as would othervise be possible” (p. 11). In the same 
vein,    Ersel  and  Sak  (1997)  propose  the  notion  of  uncertainty  induced  liquidity  preference  to  explain   35
The fact that large manufacturing firms hold substantially more (about the twice) 
financial assets than the small and medium sized firms in Turkey (Figure 16) is consistent 
with the view that firms may hold financial assets not only for their liquidity services but 
also  for  high  return  from  financial  assets  under  macroeconomic  uncertainty.  This 
speculative motive appears to be the case especially for large sized manufacturing firms. 
Small and medium sized manufacturing firms, which are more financially constrained, 
tend to be relatively less flexible for holding financial assets for interest income apart 
from their liquidity.   
 







































                                                                                                                                                              
corporate  sector  holding  of  liquid  financial  assets  including  government  securities  and  FX  assets  as  a 
financial  buffer under conditions of enhanced uncertainty.  Accordingly, the “distribution of the working 
capital  between  production  related  assets  and  financial  assets  depends  upon  perceived  risks  over  the 
production cycle of the corporation” (p.4). The financial crowding out, according to Ersel and Sak (1997), is 
temporary as firms transfer the accumulated financial assets to finance real investments to the next production 
cycle.  The empirical results by Ersel and Sak (1997) support the uncertainty induced liquidity preference 
hypothesis for the Turkish data and suggest that non-financial firms holding of government securities not only 
cushioned the impact of the 1994 crisis but also allowed them to have a faster post-crisis recovery.  
31 The argument about the crowding out affect of the financial assets holdings of non-financial firms may 
also be relevant for the recent US experience. According to IMF (2006, p. 136), the recent acceleration of the 
corporate sector holdings of financial assets “has offset one-half of the increase in government and household net 
borrowing, thereby helping to mitigate the impact on the external deficit”.    36
Figure 17 plots the ratio of interest income to operating profits of the non-financial 
firms  during  the  period  along  with  ex  ante  real  interest  rates  (R_Int)  on  government 
securities.
32 Not surprisingly, the interest income ratio for all firm groups tends to follow 
a similar path with the real interest rates. Consistent with their financial assets holding 
behaviour as depicted by Figure 16, the interest income ratio appears to increase with 
firm size in manufacturing industry. During most of the period, their heavier investment 
on financial assets yielded large sized manufacturing firms to obtain substantial interest 
income reaching about 45% and 35% of their operating profits with the jump of the real 
interest rates in 1999 and 2001, respectively. The interest income ratios for all the firm 
groups  tend  to  decline  gradually  after  the  2001  financial  crisis.  This  may  plausibly 
interpreted as resulting from the decline in macroeconomic uncertainty and thus in the 
real interest rates with enhanced monetary policy credibility and better macroeconomic 
stance after the 2001 financial crisis.  
Figure 18 shows the ratios of interest income and net profits to net sales of the non-
financial firms. From Figure 18a, it may be strikingly inferred that there was a structural 
change in  the  manufacturing  industry income and profit generating activity behaviour 
after the 2001 financial crisis. Before the 2001 crisis, interest income appears to be the 
major  source  of  manufacturing  firms’  profits.  Prior  to  the  crisis,  the  profit  ratios  of 
manufacturing firms had been gradually decreasing whilst their interest income had been 
on an increasing trend. After 2001, compared to the pre-crisis period, we observe an 
opposite path for the evolutions of interest income and profit ratios with a gradual decline 
in interest income while an increase in profit ratios. This observation is consistent with 
the view that income from real investments rather than that from financial asset holdings 
has  become  the  major  source  of  revenue  for  manufacturing  firms  as  macroeconomic 
stability came into the picture during the post crisis period.  
The profit and interest income ratios for the large sized manufacturing firms (Figure 
18b) follow a similar path with those of the manufacturing industry in general suggesting 
that  the  latter  is  indeed  dominated  by  the  former.  The  substantial  amount of  interest 
                                                 
32 It may be preferable to consider alternative measures such as net profits or profits before taxes. However, 
for some observations these alternative measures have negative values precluding a meaningful interpretation 
of the ratios based on them.     37
income obtained by large sized firms during the financial crisis of 2001 appears to be 
effective in muting the unfavourable output impacts of the crisis for these firms. Based on 
the corporations quoted at the Istanbul Stock Exchange, Ersel and Sak (1997) find that 
financial asset holdings of firms cushioned the impact of the 1994 crisis and enabled 
them to grow in 1995. Financial assets can be interpreted as to have a similar buffering 
role  especially  for  large  sized  manufacturing  firms  also  during  the  2001  crisis.  The 
financial asset holdings of small, and to a certain extend medium, sized manufacturing 
firms  have  been  relatively  modest  (Figure  16)  leading  to  their  profitability  basically 
determined by macroeconomic and firm/sector specific conditions. Small and medium 
sized manufacturing firms with rather limited financial flexibility can be expected to hold 
liquid financial assets mainly for transactions and precautionary purposes. Large sized 
firms, on the other hand, are more flexible in allocating their assets into financial and real 
investments.  This  flexibility  allowed  large  firms  to  hold  also  speculative  motive  led 
financial assets potentially crowding out their real investments especially before the 2001 
crisis.    38
Figure 18.  Interest Income and Net Profits (% of Net Sales) 
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IV. Concluding Notes 
The balance sheets of firms contain valuable information that enables us to assess 
potential  vulnerabilities  in  the  corporate  sector  and  to  understand  the  transmission 
mechanism  through  which  macro  policies  including  monetary  policy  transmit  into 
financial and real activity of firms. One may expect that non-financial firms tend to adopt 
financial strategies through which they could survive in an environment of long lived 
macroeconomic instability, less developed financial market and institutions. In such an 
environment, non-financial firms in Turkey have been heavily exposed to balance sheet 
risks. Therefore, firms tended to avoid investing into capacity creation activity instead 
they  preferred  to  invest  heavily  in  financial  assets  over  1990s.  Eventually,  potential 
output of Turkey declined considerably in Turkey. We pay attention to some stylized 
facts that reflect the basic structure of the balance sheets of firms in this study.  
Turkish firms can be considered as highly indebted on average even though they do 
not  get  finance  directly  from  market  by  issuing  bonds.  In  other  words,  contrary  to 
financially  developed  countries,  trade  credits  and  credits  from  subsidiaries  or  parents 
constitute a very large portion of corporate sector’s external finance. The share of bank 
loans in total liabilities in Turkey is almost the same that of other emerging markets that 
have a substantial amount of bond finance. This may imply that potential bank dependent 
firms which are generally made of small sized companies, are less likely to have access to 
bank finance in Turkey, that is, they are more financially constrained consistent with low 
degree of financial deepening in Turkey. In fact, the share of bank finance for small firms 
is lower than that of large and medium sized firms and the share of small firms declines 
further  when  economy  contracts. In  general, small firms rely heavily on trade credits 
especially  during  the  recessions  while  large  firms  tend  to  use  more  bank  loans  and 
internal funds. Trade credits are expected to mute the fluctuations of small firms’ activity 
especially in bad times. Extensive use of trade credits by small firms allows large firms as 
intermediary institutions. In fact, heavily investing in liquid assets, relatively easy access 
to  bank  finance  and  operating  with  high  profit  margins  in  relatively  less  competitive 
market conditions allow large firms to provide finance to their sub-contractors or small 
firms in trade activity in form of trade credit.     40
We observe a marked shift in the finance structure of corporate sector in Turkey 
after the crisis. All firms, predominantly large ones, tend to use more internal funds in 
financing their real activity after the 2001 crisis. Similarly, in the same period, especially 
small and medium sized firms invest more in tangible assets whose share in total assets in 
corporate  sector  on  average  is  very  low  compared  to  that  of  other  emerging  and 
developed markets. The increase in the share of tangible assets of small and medium 
sized firms reaches that of large firms that has been historically higher in 2004.  
The maturity structure across firms classified in terms of size has stayed stable over 
time. The maturity of debt is increasing with firm size as expected. The firms with high 
tangible ratios have high share of long term debt. In fact, we observe a gradual decline in 
the share of short term debt for small and medium sized firms as the shares of tangible 
assets  increase  in  their  balance  sheets.  Debt  maturity  of  corporate  sector  in  Turkey 
appears to be very short compared to those of emerging economies. This is believed to be 
stemmed mainly from macroeconomic instability reflected in form of high inflation and 
therefore  Turkish  corporate  sector  is  more  vulnerable  to  external  shocks.  Therefore, 
Turkish corporate sector tend to stay more liquid compared to countries with longer debt 
maturity even Turkey experiences high inflation during the period. One may easily notice 
the  risk  of  default  with  this  debt  structure  when  look  at  interest  coverage  ratios  that 
realized below 100 percent for small and medium sized firms in the 2001 crises. The 
postions  of  all  firm  groups  have  improved  substantially  after  the  crisis  while  the 
improvement  is  more  considerable  as  firms  get  large.  However,  we  observe  a 
deteriorating trend in the interest coverage ratio for small firms in 2004.  
The figures for the maturity and currency composition of the corporate sector debt 
show  that  firms  rely  heavily  on  foreign  currency  and  short-term  debt  instruments  in 
Turkey. Such a liability composition makes firms vulnerable to both exchange rate and 
interest rate shocks through currency and maturity mismatches. Interest rate increases can 
lead to a rollover risk and a decline in the net worth of the firms with higher short term 
debt  magnifying  the  conventional  interest  rate  channel  as  postulated  by  the  financial 
accelerator  mechanism.  Real  exchange  rate  depreciation,  whilst  it  may  potentially 
improve exporting firms more competitive, can negatively affect balance sheets of non-
exporting firms.    41
Although in case of the lack of private bond market, government securities may be 
helpful  in  functioning  of  financial  market  by  providing  liquidity,  the  high  level  of 
government borrowing from domestic market tend to drain funds and thus crowd out 
private investment in Turkey. Bank dependent firms are expected to be severely affected 
from this structure that has been the main source of macroeconomic instability. However, 
the  declining  trend  of  budget  deficits  as  a  result  of  tight  fiscal  policy  and  the 
improvement  in  the  macroeconomic  conditions  including  substantial  achievements 
towards price stability may be expected to contribute to the corporate sector in achieving 
a  stronger  balance  sheet  structure.  This  may,  in  turn,  be  expected  to  be  enhancing 
macroeconomic stability and sustainable growth.  
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